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THE EMBARRASSING SAGA OF NEW
YORK'S DERIVATIVE RIGHT TO COUNSEL:
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF DEFENDANTS
SUSPECTED OF TWO UNRELATED CRIMES
OFER RABANt

INTRODUCTION

The story of New York's "derivative right to counsel" is the
story of an intellectual failure, and possibly an ethical failure, on
the part of New York's highest court. The "derivative right to
counsel"-which extended the right to counsel of defendants who
were represented by counsel on one offense, and were then
questioned about another, utterly unrelated crime-was born out
of a clearly mistaken interpretation of a 1979 case. The mistake
was eventually recognized, and the doctrine overruled, in 1990;
but the derivative right was soon reintroduced through a series of
cases purporting to apply the very case which sought to eliminate
it. The story is, at best, one of recurring bungles, both on the
part of majority opinions and on the part of the opposing
dissents. The result today is a legal regime which excludes
reliable confessions from trials for no good reason, and favors
dangerous recidivists over first time arrestees or people accused
of minor crimes. It is an often-heard accusation, and a wholly
unfounded one, that the criminal justice system coddles
criminals; yet, in the derivative right to counsel, New York
constitutional law does just that, and for no justifiable reason. It
is high time for a re-examination of this area of our law, and for
the final abolition of this unjustified constitutional doctrine.
The right to counsel under the Federal Constitution arises
principally under the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel and
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the Fifth Amendment's right against self incrimination, and
federal jurisprudence sees great significance in the distinction
between the two sources.' New York's right to counsel, however,
is much fuzzier: New York courts habitually ground their
determinations in the collective authority of the New York
Constitution's right to counsel clause, the right against self
incrimination, and the right to due process of law (probably
because all three clauses are grouped together in Article I,
Section 6 of the New York Constitution).2 This means that the
analysis of a right to counsel claim under New York law can be
quite different than an equivalent analysis under the Federal
Constitution, and a direct comparison between the two may
quickly turn confusing, if not impossible. 3 Hence, the almost
4
exclusive focus of this Article on New York law.
The Article focuses on six leading right to counsel precedents
and is arranged in a chronological order: Part I analyzes People
I U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right.. . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic]."); U.S. CONST.
amend. V ("No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .. "). The right to counsel may also arise, though less often, from
the "due process" clause. See, e.g., Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437, 441 (1948).
2 See, e.g., People v. Skinner, 52 N.Y.2d 24, 28, 417 N.E.2d 501, 503, 436
N.Y.S.2d 207, 209 (1980) ("Our determination is guided by principles founded upon
State constitutional guarantees of the privilege against self incrimination, the right
to be aided by counsel and due process."); People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203,
207, 400 N.E.2d 360, 363, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 423 (1980) ("[W]e conclude that the
issue presented here may be resolved by application of principles that are firmly
rooted in our State's constitutional and statutory guarantees of due process of law,
the privilege against self incrimination and the right to the assistance of counsel.");
People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 483, 348 N.E.2d 894, 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,421
(1976) ("[The] rule [is] grounded in this State's constitutional and statutory
guarantees of the privilege against self incrimination, the right to the assistance of
counsel, and due process of law.").
3 Indeed, the elaboration of some of New York's right to counsel protections
preceded the elaboration of equivalent federal rights. See generally Peter J. Galie,
State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of Defendants' Rights: The Case of
New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 157, 178-86 (1979) (noting that the right to
counsel in New York has an extensive history and examining a number of New York
cases that went beyond the federal requirements for a defendant's right to counsel).
4 Moreover, New York provides criminal defendants with right to counsel
protections that are far more extensive than the federal ones. See, e.g., People v.
Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 351, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474, 486 (1990)
(Kaye, J., concurring as to result in Bing and Medina, and dissenting as to Cawley)
("[T]his court applying the New York State Constitution evolved a body of law that
'constitute[s] the strongest protection of right to counsel anywhere in the country.'"
(quoting Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: JudicialActivism Among State
Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 764 (1982)).
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v. Rogers,5 the case that inadvertently spawned New York's
derivative right to counsel, and People v. Bartolomeo,6 the case
that purported to borrow the derivative right to counsel from
Rogers but which in fact single-handedly invented it; Part II
examines how Bartolomeo and its invented derivative right to
counsel were overruled by People v. Bing;7 Part III shows how
People v. West 8 misinterpreted People v. Bing; Part IV shows how
People v. Steward9 misinterpreted People v. Bing in a different
way; Part V examines the latest Court of Appeals authority on
New York's derivative right to counsel, People v. Burdo,10
showing how it, too, misinterpreted People v. Bing; and Part VI
concludes with a proposal to reinstall Bing, ignore West,
reinterpret Steward, and scrap Burdo.
The road to today's derivative right to counsel has been
paved with numerous judicial errors. This Article is a journey
through those errors and an attempt to clear the path for the
final elimination of the doctrine.
I. PEOPLE V. ROGERS AND PEOPLE V. BARTOLOMEO

New York constitutional law recognizes an "indelible" right
to counsel-a right to counsel which defendants can waive only in
their counsel's presence. This famous-for some, infamous"indelible" right attaches with the commencement of formal
proceedings against the defendant, or when an attorney begins
representing the defendant, or when the defendant requests an
attorney.1 1 Thus, if a defendant is represented by an attorney
regarding a certain criminal matter, and the police arrest him for
questioning on that matter, the defendant cannot waive his right

5 48 N.Y.2d 167, 397 N.E.2d 709, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18 (1979).

53 N.Y.2d 225, 423 N.E.2d 371, 440 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1981), overruled by Bing, 76

6

N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
7 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
8 81 N.Y.2d 370, 615 N.E.2d 968, 599 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1993).
9 88 N.Y.2d 496, 670 N.E.2d 214, 646 N.Y.S.2d 974 (1996).
10 91 N.Y.2d 146, 690 N.E.2d 854, 667 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1997).
11

There are two well-defined situations in which the right is said to attach
indelibly under the State Constitution and a waiver, notwithstanding the
client's right to waive generally, will not be recognized unless made in the
presence of counsel. The first ...
deals with waivers after formal
proceedings have commenced. The second... relates to uncharged
individuals in custody who have retained or requested an attorney.
Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 339, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (citations omitted).
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to counsel and answer questions without his counsel present.
Any such waiver would be considered ineffective, and any
statement made by the defendant could be suppressed at trial on
the ground that it was obtained in violation of the defendant's
right to counsel. Once the indelible right to counsel has attached,
an effective waiver of the right to counsel can be made only in the
presence of counsel (which is to say, rather rarely).
People v. Rogers involved a suspect who was arrested and
taken to a police station for questioning about a robbery. 12 After
he was given Miranda warnings, Rogers told the police that he
was represented by an attorney in regard to the matter for which
questioning was sought, but that he was willing to answer
questions in his attorney's absence. 13
After a two-hour
interrogation, during which Rogers denied any involvement in
the crime, the police received a communication from Rogers'
attorney requesting that they cease further questioning.
Thereafter, the police asked no further questions about the
offense for which Rogers was represented, but instead continued
to question him regarding other alleged offenses-"unrelated
activities in which he [in fact] had not participated."' 14 That
questioning continued for approximately four more hours, during
which time Rogers remained manacled. At last, Rogers uttered
an incriminating statement concerning the robbery for which he
was arrested and originally interrogated. At the trial for that
crime, Rogers moved to suppress his statement on the ground
that his right to counsel under the New York Constitution had
been violated. 15
There was no doubt that Rogers could not have waived his
right to counsel in the absence of his counsel in regard to the
robbery interrogation: Rogers was represented by counsel on
that offense, and his counsel even contacted the police and asked
them to cease any questioning. Thus, Rogers' indelible right to
counsel had attached, and any waiver made in the absence of
counsel would have been ineffective. However, the prosecution
claimed that a waiver in the presence of counsel was necessary
only when the defendant was subjected to interrogation about the
12 People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167,
20 (1979).
13 Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422
14 Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422
15 Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422

170, 397 N.E.2d 709, 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18,
N.Y.S.2d at 20.
N.Y.S.2d at 20.
N.Y.S.2d at 20.
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crime for which he was represented, but not when he was
questioned about unrelated crimes. 16
Thus, the four-hour
interrogation following Rogers' attorney's request to stop
questioning was claimed to have been proper because dealing
only with unrelated matters. 17 Indeed, a 1971 case, People v.
Taylor, had explicitly held that defendants could waive their
right to counsel in the absence of counsel when questioned about
offenses which were unrelated to those for which their indelible
18
right had attached.
The trial court agreed and denied Rogers' motion to suppress
the statement. The Appellate Division affirmed the denial, and
the Court of Appeals then granted review of the case and
reversed, holding, in an opinion written by then-Chief Judge
Cooke and joined by Judges Jones, Wachtler, Fuchsberg, and
Meyer, that "once an attorney has entered the proceeding,
thereby signifying that the police should cease questioning, a
defendant in custody may not be further interrogated in the
19
absence of counsel."
People v. Bartolomeo came two years after Rogers and
involved a defendant who was arrested for an arson charge, was
arraigned for that charge with his counsel present, was released
from custody, and was re-arrested a week later for questioning on
an unrelated homicide. 20 The officers knew that Bartolomeo was
16 Id. at 171, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
17 Id. at 171, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20.
18 People v. Taylor, 27 N.Y.2d 327, 330, 332, 266 N.E.2d 630, 631, 633, 318

N.Y.S.2d 1, 3, 5 (1971).
19 Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 710-11, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19.

20 People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 230, 423 N.E.2d 371, 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d
894, 896-97 (1981), overruled by People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011,
559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
This Article deals exclusively with questioning on "unrelated" offenses. A
different line of cases, and a different set of considerations, apply where the offense
for which the defendant is represented and the offense for which he is questioned are
"related." See, e.g., People v. Cohen, 90 N.Y.2d 632, 638-39, 687 N.E.2d 1313, 131617, 665 N.Y.S.2d 30, 33-34 (1997) (noting that a police interrogation of a suspect on
the subject of one crime after the right to counsel had indelibly attached as to
another crime falls into two categories, the first being where the two criminal
matters are so closely related transactionally that questioning on the unrepresented
matter would elicit incriminating responses in the matter in which the suspect had
an attorney); People v. Ermo, 47 N.Y.2d 863, 865, 392 N.E.2d 1248, 1249-50, 419
N.Y.S.2d 65, 66 (1979) (holding that had the police interrogated the defendant about
a homicide only, his statements would not have been suppressible because the
attorney's representation of the defendant was on a different and unrelated assault
charge); People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97, 104-05, 359 N.E.2d 402, 407, 390 N.Y.S.2d
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previously arrested on a different charge (they were from the
same police agency which made the previous arrest), but they did
not know, nor did they bother to find out, whether he was
actually represented on that charge. Bartolomeo was given
Miranda warnings, agreed to waive his right to counsel, and gave
police an incriminating statement regarding the homicide about
which he was interrogated. 21 He then sought to suppress his
22
statement at the trial for that offense.
As in Rogers, there was no doubt that Bartolomeo's indelible
right to counsel had attached in regard to the offense for which
he was represented by counsel, and for which he was also
arraigned (so that formal proceedings had commenced). Thus,
any statements made to the police after a purported waiver of
counsel obtained in the absence of counsel would have been
suppressible at a trial on that offense. But in Bartolomeo the
issue of suppression arose at a trial on the unrelated homicide, in
regard to which Bartolomeo did not yet have an indelible right to
counsel at the time that his statements were made. 23 Thus, since
no indelible right to counsel had yet attached in regard to that
offense, Bartolomeo could have presumably waived his right to
counsel in the absence of counsel and answered police questions.
The trial judge denied suppression of Bartolomeo's
statements, and the Appellate Division affirmed. The Court of
Appeals granted review and reversed. Applying People v. Rogers,
the Court concluded that Bartolomeo could not have waived his
right to counsel in the absence of counsel, and ordered his
statements suppressed. 2 4 The entire part of the opinion dealing
with the application of Rogers to the factual situation in
Bartolomeo was as this:
Knowledge that one in custody is represented by counsel, albeit
on a separate, unrelated charge, precludes interrogation in the

893, 899 (1976) (holding that defendant's statements regarding related crimes made
in the course of an interview with the Civilian Complaint Review Board were
obtained in violation of his right to counsel).
21 Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 230, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
22 Id. at 230, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
23 Bartolomeo had a right to counsel in that he could have requested an
attorney, and police questioning would then have had to cease until he met with one.
But Bartolomeo did not yet possess an indelible right-that is, a right that he could
not waive without an attorney present-in regard to the second offense for which he
was arrested.
24 See Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 231, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
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absence of counsel and renders ineffective any purported waiver
of the assistance of counsel when such waiver occurs out of the
presence'of the attorney (People v. Miller, 54 N.Y.2d 616; People
v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167). The same consequence flows from
knowledge, such as that possessed by Detectives Rafferty and
Donohue here, that the defendant has been arrested only seven
days earlier by members of the same police department on an
arson charge, if in fact the defendant has counsel on the earlier
25
charge.

People v. Miller, to which the opinion cited, is irrelevant to our
issue, as it concerned interrogation on related offenses. 26 As for
Rogers, Bartolomeo offered no analysis of that case, no
comparison between Rogers' factual predicate and its own, no
policy reasons supporting Rogers or Rogers' application to the
Bartolomeo circumstances-nothing but the above short and
conclusory statement, declaring, as a matter of clear and
undisputable deduction, the applicability of Rogers to the case at
hand.
And yet Rogers was a very different case than Bartolomeo.
In Rogers, the Court suppressed a statement at the trial for the
original offense for which the defendant was represented at the

time that he made his statement.2 7 In Bartolomeo, by contrast,
the Court suppressed a statement at the trial for the offense for
which the defendant was not represented by counsel, and
regarding which his indelible right to counsel had presumably
28
not yet attached at the time that his statement was made.
Nowhere did Rogers hold-and indeed Rogers had no occasion to

25
26

Id. at 231, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
See People v. Miller, 54 N.Y.2d 616, 618, 425 N.E.2d 879, 881, 442 N.Y.S.2d

491, 493 (1981). The Miller opinion suppressed three statements made in regard to

three different offenses: two on the ground that the defendant's indelible right to
counsel had attached at the time of the questioning; one on the ground that the
questioning was interrelated with questioning on one of the offenses in regard to
which the indelible right to counsel had attached (a finding upon which the
Appellate Division also relied in its decision). As an aside to the third suppression,
the court added, 'Moreover, as defendant was known to be represented by counsel in
connection with the 'McE' rape charge, questioning on other matters was precluded
(People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167)." Id. at 619, 425 N.E.2d at 881, 442 N.Y.S.2d at
493. The three offenses, it should be noted, were charged in the same indictment. On
the right to counsel in regard to interrogations on related offenses, see supra note
20.
27 See People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 169-70, 397 N.E.2d 709, 711, 422
N.Y.S.2d 18, 19-20 (1979).
28 See Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 231, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
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hold-that its ruling applied to statements regarding an
unrelated offense at the trial for that offense. Rogers' holding
merely suppressed a defendant's statement in the very
29
proceeding into which "an attorney has [already] entered."
The distinction between holding and dicta is important for
realizing the inadequacy of the Bartolomeo opinion's summary
reliance on Rogers. As we all know, if a court makes a
pronouncement whose validity is irrelevant to the verdict in the
case, that pronouncement is dicta; if a pronouncement's validity
is necessary for the verdict, it is holding. The genius of precedent
consists, to a large measure, in its grounding in particular fact
situations-in the fact that it derives from the meeting of
abstract law and concrete reality, and not from mere hypothetical
conjectures. A judicial declaration that is a mere aside to the
factual circumstances before the court is therefore not a part of
the precedent's holding, and its application to a new case
requires a justification going beyond the mere reference to that
precedent. Since Rogers did not involve a factual situation where
admissibility of statements was sought at a trial on the unrelated
and unrepresented offense, its pronouncements in regard to any
such hypothetical claim (if existing at all) could not have been its
holding; they were superfluous to its decision to suppress Rogers'
statements. Bartolomeo was a clear and radical expansion of
Rogers, and its decision required much more than the mere
reliance on Rogers-though, to repeat, nothing more was given.
There were other significant differences between Bartolomeo
and Rogers: the Rogers opinion noted that the police continued to
question the defendant, after his attorney requested that they
stop, on "unrelated activities in which he had not participated"thus suggesting that the police used the questioning on
"unrelated activities" as a pretext for continuing their
questioning. 30
By contrast, in Bartolomeo, the "unrelated
activities" were the very crimes on whose trial the defendant was
seeking to suppress his statements. 3 1 In Rogers, the police
questioned the defendant for two hours on the original offense
even after he had told them that he was represented by an

29

30
31

See Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 710, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19.
See id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20 (emphasis added).
See Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 229-30, 423 N.E.2d at 373-74, 440 N.Y.S.2d at
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attorney in regard to that offense; 32 no such impropriety occurred
in Bartolomeo. And in Rogers, unlike in Bartolomeo, the
questionings constituted one continuous session, and it did not
appear that the police gave the defendant fresh Miranda
warnings before questioning him on the unrelated crimes. 33 In
Bartolomeo, the questionings were separated by more than a
week, and fresh Miranda warnings were given. 34 In short, the
circumstances surrounding Rogers' interrogation convinced the
Court that to admit Rogers' statement would have amounted to
rewarding police misconduct. 35 Moreover, if Rogers' statements
were held admissible, then a defendant's indelible right to
counsel could have been easily subverted: the police would
simply purport to question defendants about offenses unrelated
to those for which their indelible rights had already attached,
with the knowledge that any statements made about the original
offenses would be perfectly admissible at their trial. That, in
36
fact, was the principal concern underlying the Rogers decision.
By contrast, in Bartolomeo there was no apparent police
misconduct and no subversion of any existing indelible right to
counsel.

I mention all these differences not in order to claim that
Bartolomeo could have been convincingly distinguished from
Rogers (of course it could), but to show that Rogers' holding was
never meant to apply to a case like Bartolomeo. Granted, the
Rogers opinion (like many we will examine) was far from clear
and even self-contradictory. 37 But although some of Rogers'
32 See Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20. Indeed,
the court's opinion drew attention to this improper questioning by remarking in a
footnote that: "Defendant does not challenge on this appeal ... the statements made
by defendant prior to the call to the police by defendant's attorney." Id. at 170 n.1,
397 N.E.2d at 711 n.1, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 20 n.1.
33 "Thereafter, the police asked no further questions about the robbery but,
under a purported waiver of defendant's rights, continued to question concerning
unrelated activities in which he had not participated." Id. at 170, 397 N.E.2d at 711,
422 N.Y.S.2d at 20. It is unclear whether the purported waiver was the original one
or a new one.
34 Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 230-31, 423 N.E.2d at 374, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97.
35 See Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 173-74, 397 N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
36 See People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 353, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1024, 559 N.Y.S.2d
474, 487 (1990) (Kaye, J., dissenting) ("In Rogers .... this court determined to call a
halt to the facile evasion of defendants' constitutional rights ....).
37 The opinion started by claiming: 'We hold today that once an attorney has
entered the proceeding, thereby signifying that the police should cease questioning,
a defendant in custody may not be further interrogated in the absence of counsel."
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pronouncements, torn out of context, appear to be congruent with
Bartolomeo's reading of the case, those pronouncements were
inapplicable to suppression issues at the trial on the unrelated
38
matters (rather than at a trial on the original offense).
Moreover, to repeat, they were all dicta.
In short, the Bartolomeo decision showed a complete lack of
awareness that Rogers' application to the case represented a
fundamental expansion of Rogers from suppression of statements
at the trial for offenses for which defendants' right to counsel had
indelibly attached, to suppression of statements at trials for
offenses for which defendants did not yet possess an indelible
right. 39 Whereas the dissenting opinion, while characterizing the

Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d at 169, 397 N.E.2d at 710-711, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 19. And yet a
footnote in the opinion read:
Contrary to the suggestion of the dissent, this holding creates no undue
impediment to the investigation of criminal conduct unrelated to the
pending charge. An accused represented by counsel may still be questioned
about such matters; we hold simply that information obtained through that
questioning in the absence of counsel may not be used against him.
Id. at 173 n.2, 397 N.E.2d at 713 n.2, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22 n.2. The last sentence in
the footnote read, "Thus, the police may continue to obtain information from a
defendant who is a mere witness to unrelated events." Id. at 173 n.2, 397 N.E.2d at
713 n.2, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22 n. 2. Perhaps the Court merely meant to authorize the
questioning of defendants who were witnesses to a crime. But the Court also stated
that it was "the role of defendant's attorney, not the State, to determine whether a
particular matter will or will not touch upon the extant charge." Id. at 173, 397
N.E.2d at 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d at 22.
38 In the later Bing case, the Court said:
The concurring Judges contend that Bartolomeo is premised on the
necessity to have an attorney present to determine whether the
interrogation is related to the prior pending charges .... [Tihe need for
[such] a... rule was recognized in Rogers because an attorney had entered
the proceeding for which defendant was arrested. We decided that under
those circumstances the attorney must be allowed to resolve whether police
questioning was related to those charges on which defendant was
represented. There is no such requirement in these cases, however, because
no attorneys had appeared in the [new, unrelated] proceedings and
defendants voluntarily chose to forego legal representation on the new
charges. Thus, there is no basis for the concurrence's argument that the
attorney must be brought into the new proceeding to decide whether the
questions are related to the prior charges. The courts are fully capable of
protecting the defendants' rights on both the prior pending charges and the
new charges.
Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 349, 558 N.E.2d at 1021-22, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484-85.
39 Some of the literature disagrees. A Comment written by a law student
proclaimed that "[t]he Bartolomeo court rightly saw its opinion as following
naturally from and directly resolved by the Rogers decision, and therefore offered
little justification for its holding .... [T]he Rogers opinion can, and was intended to
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decision (in contrast with the majority) as an expansion of
Rogers, failed to clearly identify wherein lay that expansion,
stating:
[T]he issue on this appeal is whether this court should extend
the rule of People v. Rogers to the facts of the present case. The
majority holds that because the defendant had been represented
by counsel on prior charges at the time of the interrogation the
incriminating statements the defendant gave in the absence of
counsel must be suppressed. The majority fails to accord
significance to the fact that the police knew only that defendant
had been previously arrested and did not know defendant had
counsel on those earlier charges, or to the fact that defendant
never indicated in any manner that he desired the aid of an
40
attorney.

Thus, the Bartolomeo majority radically expanded New York's
indelible right to counsel without the slightest of explanations,
the dissent complained that the police were unaware that the
defendant was represented on the unrelated offense, and a felony
murder conviction was unceremoniously vacated (the defendant
pumped three bullets into the person whose home he was
41
burglarizing). New York's derivative right to counsel was born.
II. PEOPLEV. BING

It took the Court of Appeals nine years to realize its mistake
and attempt to correct it. Finally, in People v. Bing,42 the Court
characterized Bartolomeo (according to the dissent in the case) as
be read to dictate the outcome in Bartolomeo." Charles J. Sullivan, Comment, People
v. Bing: Did the New York Court of Appeals Throw Baby Bartolomeo Out With His
Bath Water, 40 BUFF. L. REV. 835, 865 (1992) (footnotes omitted). The article not
only does not try to explain the patently wrong claim that Rogers controlled
Bartolomeo, it goes so far as to assert that the claim needed no explanation. As we
saw earlier, this evidences a fundamental failure to distinguish between holding and
dicta.
40 People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 236-39, 423 N.E.2d at 377-79, 440
N.Y.S.2d at 900-02 (1981) (Wachtler, J., dissenting; joined by Jasen & Gabrielli, JJ.)
(citations omitted), overruled by People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559
N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
41 In People v. Robles, decided seven years after Bartolomeo, Judge Wachtler
(who dissented in Bartolomeo) was clearer, stating that "Rogers established a ...
limited right with respect to unrelated charges in order to protect the ... right to
counsel in the pending proceeding" and that "our primary concern in Rogers was
that questioning on unrelated charges might interfere with the attorney-client
relationship that existed with respect to the pending charges." People v. Robles, 72
N.Y.2d 689, 697-98, 533 N.E.2d 240, 244, 536 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (1988).
42 76 N.Y.2d 331, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 559 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1990).
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"an aberrant decision not worthy of precedential respect, a
decision without a principled basis or even a rationale ....
Bing, a decision written by Judge Simons (who was joined by
then Chief Judge Wachtler and Judges Hancock and Bellacosa 44),
was a consolidation of three cases-People v. Bing, People v.
45
Cawley, and People v. Medina.
Defendant Bing had counsel on a pending charge in Ohio.
The police arrested Bing on the Ohio warrant and then proceeded
to question him about his involvement in a New York burglary
which was unrelated to the Ohio crime. 46 The police (obviously)
knew of the pending Ohio charge, but made no inquiries as to
whether Bing was represented.
After receiving Miranda
warnings, Bing waived his right to counsel and made selfincriminating statements about the New York burglary. 47 He
then moved to suppress his statements at his trial for the
48
burglary.
In People v. Cawley,49 the defendant was charged in New
York with robbery. Following his arraignment, with counsel
present, the defendant was released on bail. He thereafter
absconded and remained at large until caught on a bench
warrant for that robbery six months later.50
He was then
questioned on an unrelated murder by a police officer who was
unaware of the prior representation. 5 1 Cawley waived his right
to counsel and confessed to committing the murder. 52 He then
53
moved to suppress his confession at his murder trial.
54
In People v. Medina, the defendant was released on a
pending assault charge and soon thereafter was questioned about
the unrelated murder of two of his neighbors. The police officer
43 Id. at 352, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (Kaye, J., concurring and
dissenting).
44 Current-Chief Judge Kaye wrote a dissenting opinion in which she was joined
by Judges Alexander and Titone.
45 People v. Cawley, 150 A.D.2d 994, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st Dep't 1989); People
v. Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344, 541 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1st Dep't 1989); People v. Bing, 146
A.D.2d 178, 540 N.Y.S.2d 247 (2d Dep't 1989).
46 Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 335, 558 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76.
47 Id. at 335, 558 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76.
48 Id. at 335, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
49 150 A.D.2d 994, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1st Dep't 1989).
50 Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 336, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
51 Id. at 336, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
52 Id. at 336, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
53 Id. at 336, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
54 146 A.D.2d 344, 541 N.Y.S.2d 355 (1st Dep't 1989).
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investigating the murders knew that Medina had been recently
held on an assault charge, but thought, erroneously, that the
case against Medina was dismissed. 55 Medina was brought to the
police station, waived his right to counsel, and made selfincriminating statements about these murders. 56 He moved to
57
suppress the statements at his trial for the murders.
Bing began its analysis by noting that People v. Taylor58
allowed a waiver of right to counsel in cases where "statements
[were] made to police in response to inquiries about crimes
unrelated to those on which the suspect had representation," and
that "[w]e modified the Taylor rule somewhat in People v. Rogers
[1979]." 59 (Rogers modified Taylor by forbidding such a waiver
where statements made "in response to inquiries about crimes
unrelated to those on which the suspect had representation" were
in fact about the original, represented crime.) The opinion
continued:
It was against this background that the court in June 1981
issued its decision prohibiting the police from questioning a
suspect not only on the pending charge, on which the right to
counsel had attached, but also on a new, unrelated charge
under investigation on which defendant had waived the right to
counsel.

60

Declaring that, as things stood, the three cases-Bing, Cawley
and Medina-"involve no more than a routine application of the
Bartolomeo rule and under a strict application of the doctrine of
stare decisis, which requires that cases similar to each other be
decided the same, defendants' statements must be suppressed,"
the Court moved to consider two exceptions to Bartolomeo urged
by the prosecution.6 1 In People v. Bing, the urged exception
pertained to "pending charges in other States" 62 (Bing had a
pending charge in Ohio); and in People v. Cawley an exception
was urged "for defendants who implicitly relinquish the attorneyclient relationship by absconding" (Cawley absconded after he
55 Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 336, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
56

Id. at 336, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.

57 Id. at 336, 558 N.E.2d at 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 476.

27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971).
59 Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 340, 558 N.E.2d at 1015, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (citations
omitted).
60 Id. at 341, 558 N.E.2d at 1016, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 479.
61 Id. at 344, 558 N.E.2d at 1018, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
62 Id. at 344, 558 N.E.2d at 1018, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
58
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was released on bail).63
The Court rejected both proposals: "There is no logical
reason to proscribe the police conduct if the pending charge is in
New York but permit it if the pending charge is in Ohio"; and "If
a defendant cannot expressly reject counsel, there seems to be
little legal basis for a judicial inquiry to determine whether he or
she has impliedly done so [by absconding]. '"64 Instead, stating
that "a fundamental change is required," the Court explicitly
overruled Bartolomeo.65 In Bartolomeo, explained Bing, "the
right to counsel on the new charge was derived from
representation on a prior pending charge." 66 This "fictional"
derivative right rewarded persistent offenders (first time
arrestees could waive their right to counsel and answer
questions, whereas those already represented on a previous
charge could not), and lacked a principled basis that could justify
its social cost. 67 Bing therefore eliminated that derivative right
altogether and held the statements in all three cases
68
admissible.
Nonetheless, Bing explicitly retained the holding of People v.
Rogers.69
It distinguished Rogers from Bartolomeo in the
following way:
[A]lthough Rogers and Bartolomeo are frequently linked in legal
literature and Rogers was the only case cited to support the new
rule adopted in Bartolomeo, the two holdings are quite different.
In People v. Rogers, the right to counsel had been invoked on the
charges on which defendant was taken into custody and he and
his counsel clearly asserted it ....
In People v. Bartolomeo,
however, defendant was taken into custody for questioning on a
new, unrelated charge. He was not represented on that charge
and freely waived his right to counsel. Since the right to
counsel is personal and may be waived by a defendant, the court
had to create an indelible right, a right that defendant could not
waive in the absence of counsel, to justify suppression of the
voluntary statement. It did so by implying a derivative right

Id. at 344, 558 N.E.2d at 1018, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
Id. at 345-46, 558 N.E.2d at 1019-20, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 482-83.
Id. at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
Id. at 344, 558 N.E.2d at 1018, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 481.
See id. at 342, 347-48, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 1020-21, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480,
483-84.
68 See id. at 337, 558 N.E.2d at 1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
69 See id. at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
63
64
65
66
67
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70
arising from the prior pending charges.
Thus, Rogers did not rely on a "derivative" indelible right to
counsel but on an indelible right to counsel that was already
attached. Rogers invoked his indelible right to counsel at the
trial for those charges for which he was already represented
when questioned, and regarding which his lawyer had contacted
the police and requested the termination of questioning. In
Bartolomeo, by contrast, the right was invoked at the trial for the
unrelated charges on which the defendant was not represented,
71
and in which his indelible right to counsel had not yet attached.
Bartolomeo's right was entirely derivative (Bartolomeo derived
his right to counsel from his representation on the original arson
charge), whereas there was nothing derivative about Rogers'
right. So Rogers remained a binding precedent while Bartolomeo
was overruled.
It seemed, at that point, that an embarrassing episode had
finally come to an end. Not so.

III. PEOPLEV. WEST

People v. West 72 came three years after Bing. West, who was
a suspect in a homicide investigation, was represented by an
attorney on the matter. 73 The investigation reached a dead-end,
and the defendant was never charged. Three years later, the
police received new information about the crime, and an agent for
the police was sent to record statements made by West. 74 The
statements were later admitted at the trial, and West was
convicted of murder.
The Appellate Division affirmed the
conviction, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding a violation
of defendant's constitutional right to counsel because "[m]ere
passage of this period of time... did not eradicate defendant's
indelible right."75 Thus the West case did not involve the issue
before Ring, Bartolomeo, or Rogers-viz., defendant's right to
counsel in regard to a second offense unrelated to the one for
which he was represented. 76 Yet Bing, Bartolomeo, and Rogers
70 Id. at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (citations omitted).
71 Id. at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
72 81 N.Y.2d 370, 615 N.E.2d 968, 599 N.Y.S.2d 484 (1993).
73 Id. at 372, 615 N.E.2d at 969, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
74 Id. at 372, 615 N.E.2d at 969-70, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 485-86.
75 Id. at 373, 379-80, 615 N.E.2d at 970, 974, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 486, 490.
76 See id. at 377-79, 615 N.E.2d at 972-74, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 488-90.
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came up in rather lengthy dicta, as a response to some comments
made by the dissent.
The majority opinion, written by Chief Judge Kaye (who
dissented in Bing), clearly misinterpreted all three cases:
[U]nder Rogers, a right to counsel in a matter in which
defendant is not represented arises in the first instance only
because of defendant's actual representation in another
matter ....
After Rogers, a broader rule developed that prohibited police
questioning whenever a defendant had counsel in a unrelated
matter (see, People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 232, overruled
People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d, at 341-342). Like Rogers, this right
was derivative and dependent on the actual existence of an
attorney-client relationship. Unlike Rogers, the Bartolomeo
right could attach without police awareness of the unrelated
representation. From the start, therefore, the Bartolomeo right
was problematic (see, People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d, at 341-342).
Under Bartolomeo, the police were obliged to inquire whether a
suspect was represented in any unrelated matter of which they
had knowledge. Failing such inquiry, the police were bound by
what such inquiry would have revealed-meaning the
derivative right could attach without actual knowledge that the
suspect was represented by counsel at all. Indeed, that was the
case in Bartolomeo itself, where the police questioning
defendant had no knowledge of his representation in an
unrelated matter, yet were charged with having violated
defendant's derivative right (People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d, at
230-232).
... Ultimately, however, we concluded that the societal cost

could not be justified, and overruled Bartolomeo (Peoplev. Bing,
76 N.Y.2d, at 349).77

As always with dicta, it is hard to pin down the precise meaning
of the analysis, since it was proposed in the abstractdisconnected from any factual situation which could demonstrate
its operation and applicability. Nevertheless, the analysis made
some clearly wrong assertions. To begin with, it claimed that
Rogers entailed a derivative right to counsel, derived from actual
representation on a previous offense and attaching to questioning
on a new, unrelated offense.7 8 But as we saw, Rogers upheld a
Id. at 377-78, 615 N.E.2d at 973-74, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 489-90.
According to West, a Rogers right to counsel does not arise "if at the time of
questioning, the accused is not actually represented in the unrelated matter[;] for
example, if the right to counsel had attached solely because of the commencement of
77

78
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defendant's right to counsel in an offense for which the defendant
was already represented, and had no occasion to announce a
derivative right on an unrelated matter. In any event, no such
derivative right to counsel would have survived the holding in
Bing. Bing was very clear about what it considered wrong with
Bartolomeo and why Bartolomeo was distinguishable from
Rogers: Rogers suppressed a statement at the trial for the
offense for which the defendant was represented when making
his statements; 79 Bartolomeo, by contrast, suppressed a
statement at the trial for the unrelated, unrepresented offense
for which no indelible right had yet attached.8 0 For Bing,
Bartolomeo stood for the proposition that "the right to counsel on
the new charge was derived from representation on a prior
pending charge."8 1 Indeed, Bing blasted Bartolomeo for failing to
explain "why Rogers should be expanded so dramatically to
protect a suspect ...on the new crime unrelated to the matter
82
upon which defendant actually obtained representation."
Bartolomeo's mistake was the invention of a derivative right to
counsel, and Bing overruled Bartolomeo in order to eliminate
that derivative right.
It was preposterous to claim that Bing overruled Bartolomeo
because under Bartolomeo, "the police were obliged to inquire
whether a suspect was represented in any unrelated matter of
which they had knowledge."8 3 In fact, Bing positively endorsed
formal proceedings-no Rogers right arises." Id. at 377, 615 N.E.2d at 973, 599
N.Y.S.2d at 489. It remained unexplained why Rogers should extend its generous
protections to defendants who were actually represented by an attorney, but deny
that protection to defendants whose indelible right to an attorney has attached but
who did not yet have a lawyer retained or assigned to them. The case which upheld
this seemingly arbitrary distinction, People v. Kazmarick, 52 N.Y.2d 322, 324-25,
420 N.E.2d 45, 46-47, 438 N.Y.S.2d 247, 248-49 (1981), offered no good answer for
this. My belief, shared by the dissent in Kazmarick, is that it was an unprincipled
attempt to curb the derivative right to counsel. See id. at 330-32, 420 N.E.2d at 5051, 438 N.Y.S.2d at 252-53 (Cooke, C.J., dissenting).
79 See People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 350, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d
474, 485 (1990).
80 See id. at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
81 Id. at 344, 558 N.E.2d at 1018, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 481; see also id. at 346, 558
N.E.2d at 1020, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 483 ('The legal basis for the [Bartolomeo] rule is a
derivative right arising from an established attorney-client relationship on prior
pending charges."); id. at 349, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484
("Bartolomeo... rests on a fictional attorney-client relationship derived from a prior
charge ....").
82 Id. at 341, 558 N.E.2d at 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
83 West, 81 N.Y.2d 370, 378, 615 N.E.2d at 973, 599 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
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Bartolomeo's attribution of knowledge of representation to the
police-citing approvingly to cases "requiring the police to engage
in a good-faith effort to determine if there was representation on
84
the pending charges."
Additionally, according to this mistaken interpretation,
People v. Taylor 5 was overruled by Rogers.
Taylor was
represented by counsel on a previous charge when he agreed to
waive his right to counsel and answer questions about an
unrelated offense, and the police were fully aware of the
representation. 6 The Court of Appeals held Taylor's statements
admissible on the ground that they were made during an
interrogation about an offense unrelated to the one on which the
defendant was represented. But if Rogers would have mandated
the suppression of Bartolomeo's statements if only the officers
knew about Bartolomeo's previous representation, then Taylor's
statements should have been suppressed as well and Taylor
would have been overruled by Rogers. But Rogers, which
mentioned Taylor, did not state that it was overruling it, and
Bing explicitly mentioned that Taylor was not overruled by
Rogers, stating: 'Wemodified the Taylor rule somewhat in People
87
v. Rogers."
Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 345, 558 N.E.2d at 1019, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 482.
27 N.Y.2d 327, 266 N.E.2d 630, 318 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1971).
Id. at 328-29, 332, 266 N.E.2d at 630-31, 633, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 2, 5.
Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 340, 558 N.E.2d at 1015-16, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 478-79
(emphasis added) (citations omitted). A 1992 Comment in a law review cited to
84
85
86
87

People v. Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d 610, 357 N.E.2d 955, 389 N.Y.S.2d 299 (1976), which
was

interspaced

between

Taylor and Rogers, as

an indication that Rogers

"apparently overturn[ed] Taylor." Robert W. Connolly, Comment, New York's Right
to Counsel: Overturning the Derivative Rule, 56 ALB. L. REV. 197, 207 (1992).
According to the Comment, Ramos demonstrated that the post-Taylor Court "was
looking for a way to expand the right to counsel," so that Rogers completed the
gradual erosion of Taylor by simply overturning it. Id. at 207. The Comment,
however, misrepresented Ramos' holding. In Ramos, the Court of Appeals ordered
the suppression of a statement made by a defendant who had counsel in one case,
and was then taken for interrogation on another, unrelated offense. When the
defendant was taken for this unrelated questioning, his lawyer, who was present,
stated in open court, "I have advised [the defendant] not to make any statements to
these police officers who are taking him into custody." Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d at 612, 357
N.E.2d at 957, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 301. The Comment claimed that "the court found
Taylor distinguishable [and suppressed Ramos' subsequent statement] because
there was no specific direction given in that case [i.e., Taylor] to refrain from
questioning." Connolly, supra at 207 n.87. But that was not at all why the Court of
Appeals did not find Taylor applicable. The Court made it crystal clear that its
holding was based on a finding that the defendant's lawyer, in making his
statement, "has undertaken to represent the accused with respect to the second,
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An interpretation as wrong as West's interpretation of Rogers
and Bing can be debunked from a variety of angles; but there is
little reason to belabor the point. The short of the matter is that
West's claim, that the overruling of Bartolomeo merely eliminated
the police's duty to inquire whether a defendant was represented,
ignored Bing's entire analysis and made a mockery of its holding.
(It was also a claim that presented Bing as a case making little
sense, for why would a defendant's right to counsel depend on
whether a police officer, who is aware of a pending charge,
bothers to inquire whether the defendant is represented or not?)
But what was most disturbing about this erroneous
interpretation was that this was the same interpretation of
Rogers and Bartolomeo proposed by Chief Judge Kaye in her
dissenting opinion in Bing, and soundly rejected by the Bing
majority. Kaye's dissent in Bing stated:
On defendant's appeal from his conviction [in Bartolomeo], the
main thrust of the People's argument in this court was not that
counsel in Rogers had been retained on the charge for which
defendant was then in custody, while the counseled matter in
Bartolomeo was an 'unrelated' prior charge ....
What was more novel about Bartolomeo-and the principal
point of the People's argument-was that Rogers should be
distinguished on the ground that the police had actual
knowledge of the existence of the unrelated [original] charges,
but did not have actual knowledge of defendant's representation
on those charges. We rejected that argument... [and imposed]
a duty to inquire as to the presence of counsel. ....88

Thus Kaye's dissent claimed that Bartolomeo's expansion of
unrelated crime." Ramos, 40 N.Y.2d at 616, 357 N.E.2d at 960, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 303.
And once the defendant became thus represented, his indelible non-derivative right
to counsel had attached-and Taylor became irrelevant. It is indeed interesting to
note that, as we already saw and as we shall see more below, this area of the law
suffered not only from poor judicial decisions but also, in what appears to be a
closely related two-way phenomenon, from faulty scholarship.
88 Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 354-55, 558 N.E.2d at 1025, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 488 (Kaye, J.,
concurring as to result in Bing and Medina, and dissenting as to Cawley). The
dissent in Bing also claimed that in Bartolomeo, "[als in Rogers, the court confronted
what was perceived as a means of circumventing defendant's constitutional rights
through questioning on 'unrelated' matters." Id. at 354, 558 N.E.2d at 1025, 559
N.Y.S.2d at 488 (Kaye, J., concurring as to result in Bing and Medina, and
dissenting as to Cawley). But whereas Rogers was properly portrayed as a case
where the defendant's right to counsel was "evaded," Bartolomeo was a case about
these unrelated matters. The police in Bartolomeo were not circumventing any right
to counsel because, prior to Bartolomeo, there was no such right to circumvent.
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Rogers consisted in its imposition of a duty to inquire on the
police, and it went on to denounce the overruling of Bartolomeo
on the ground that such attribution of knowledge was perfectly
reasonable. But the majority opinion, as Judge Kaye's dissent in
Bing irritably recognized, took an entirely different view of
Bartolomeo: Bartolomeo's expansion of Rogers, it said, consisted
in its invention of an unprincipled and utterly unjustified
derivative right to counsel.8 9 Yet in West, Judge Kaye presented
her dissenting view of Rogers and Bartolomeo as Bing's actual
holding!90
Judge Kaye was clearly disturbed by Bing's overruling of
Bartolomeo. She wrote in Bing:
That there are now four votes [arraigned against
Bartolomeo] ... is, of course, not a valid reason to overrule the

case. "The ultimate principle is that a court is an institution
and not merely a collection of individuals; just as a higher court
commands superiority over a lower not because it is wiser or
better but because it is institutionally higher. This is what is
meant, in part, as the rule of law and not of men."
... [T]his court in the past had placed a high value on

adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis. Not often in our
history have we explicitly overruled a recent precedent, and
rarely if ever have we done so by a closely divided court.
Perhaps even more disturbing than the extraordinary step of
overturning Bartolomeo-wrong and unnecessary as it is to do
so-is that it cannot help but unsettle the belief "that bedrock
principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities
of individuals." 91
But violating the doctrine of stare decisis is a perfectly legitimate
judicial practice: "stare decisis is a principle of policy and not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision, however
recent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision
with a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically
sounder, and verified by experience." 9 2 By contrast, to present a
89 See id. at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485 (majority opinion).
90 And this without a peep from two judges who were part of the majority in
Bing, one of whom, Judge Simons, actually wrote the Bing opinion-though it need
be remembered that this was dicta, a mere aside to the actual issue in West.
91 Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 360-61, 558 N.E.2d 1028-29, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 491-92
(Kaye, J., concurring and dissenting) (citations omitted).
92 People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 487, 348 N.E.2d 894, 900, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419,
424 (1976).
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dissenting opinion as the court's holding is to violate an
inviolable principle of our rule of law.
Chief Judge Kaye's opinion in West was joined by Judges
Titone, Hancock, Bellacosa, and Smith.
IV. PEOPLEV. STEWARD

While the return to the confusions and misinterpretations of
the past appeared as mere dicta in People v. West, 9 3 in People v.
Steward it was already the holding. 94 Steward was another
typical opinion in this unfortunate series: its holding was
obscure and ambiguous, it misread the precedents, contradicted
itself, and was ultimately based on a newly discovered
distinction, the significance of which was never explained and is
probably unexplainable.
Steward was arrested for criminal possession of a controlled
substance and for resisting arrest, was arraigned for these
offenses and assigned counsel, and was then released on his own
recognizance. 95 A few days later, Steward was re-arrested for an
unrelated parole violation. The police knew that Steward was
represented by counsel on the earlier charges, but proceeded to
interview him about a homicide unrelated to the offenses for
which he was represented, as well as the offense for which he
was arrested. 96 Steward waived his right to counsel and made
self-incriminating statements about the homicide. 97 He was then
indicted for murder. At trial, Steward moved to suppress his
statements.9 8
The trial court granted suppression of the
statements, but the Appellate Division reversed and held the
statements admissible; the Court of Appeals affirmed their
admissibility.99
"The sum and substance of [Steward's] argument," said the
Court of Appeals, "is that People v. Rogers contains a derivative
right to counsel rule that is still operative after this Court's

93 See People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370, 377-79, 615 N.E.2d 968, 973-74, 599
N.Y.S.2d 484, 489-90 (1993).
94 See People v. Steward, 88 N.Y.2d 496, 501-02, 670 N.E.2d 214, 216-17, 646
N.Y.S.2d 974, 976-77 (1996).
95 Id. at 498, 670 N.E.2d at 214-15, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 974-75.
96 Id. at 498, 670 N.E.2d at 215, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
97 Id. at 498, 670 N.E.2d at 215, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
98 Id. at 498, 670 N.E.2d at 215, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 975.
99 Id. at 498-99, 502, 670 N.E.2d at 215, 217, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 975, 977.
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holding in People v. Bing."'10 0 This was a perfectly reasonable
argument for Steward to make given that, as we have seen,
People v. West, decided three years earlier, explicitly stated that
such a "derivative right" survived Bing.10 1 Yet the Steward Court
summarily' dismissed the claim, correctly asserting that Rogers
never was about a derivative right to counsel and that "Bing
unequivocally eliminates any right to counsel derived solely from
102
a defendant's representation in a prior unrelated proceeding."
The Court, however, soon began contradicting itself. Just a
few paragraphs below, it pronounced that "Rogers establishes
and still stands for the important protection and principle that
once a defendant in custody on a particular matter is represented
by or requests counsel, custodial interrogation about any subject,
whether related or unrelated to the charge upon which
representation is sought or obtained, must cease."'10 3 The Court
also adopted People v. West's absurd contention-without citing
to that case-that Bing was all about eliminating Bartolomeo's
attribution of knowledge of representation to police officers who
were aware of a previous charge. 10 4 Thus, despite its earlier
100Id. at 499, 670 N.E.2d at 215, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 975 (citation omitted).
101 See People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370, 377-79, 615 N.E.2d 968, 973-74, 599
N.Y.S.2d 484, 489-90 (1993) ("[W]e conclude that defendant's right to counsel was
violated when the police sent an informant to... record... statements about the
counseled matter without regard to their knowledge that defendant had a lawyer in
the case.").
102 Steward, 88 N.Y.2d at 500-01, 670 N.E.2d at 216-17, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 97677.
103 Id. at 501, 670 N.E.2d at 217, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 977.
104

People v Bartolomeo built a different and significantly expanded right to
counsel rule atop Rogers' holding. After Bartolomeo, and until Bing, a duty
to inquire was imputed to the police when a defendant was in custody and
being questioned, and was represented by counsel on a prior, separate,
unrelated charge....
... Under Bartolomeo, the police were charged with an affirmative duty
to inquire whether a defendant was represented in any unrelated criminal
matter of which they had knowledge and were chargeable with the
knowledge of what such an inquiry would have revealed. Thus, even though
the interrogating officers in Bartolomeo had no knowledge that the
defendant was actually represented by counsel and the defendant had
voluntarily waived the right to counsel, this Court held that testimony
concerning the defendant's statements had to be suppressed nonetheless.
The rationale was that the officers were aware that the defendant had been
arrested earlier on an unrelated charge and were deemed to have
knowledge of the defendant's representation upon that charge.
Soon after the promulgation of the Bartolomeo extension, this Court found
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claim to the contrary, the Steward opinion conceded that a right
to counsel could derive "solely from a defendant's representation
in a prior unrelated proceeding." 10 5 If a defendant was in custody
and was represented by counsel, she would have a derivative
indelible right to counsel in any unrelated matter if the police
actually knew of the representation. Indeed, this is precisely
what happened in a case decided just a year later-a case we will
soon examine.
All of this, however, still did not explain why Steward's
statement was not suppressed. After all, the police knew that
Steward was represented by counsel on another charge when
they questioned him. If Bing was about eliminating Bartolomeo's
attribution of knowledge of representation to the police, then
Bing's holding was inapplicable to Steward-where no question
of attributing knowledge to the police ever arose-and Steward
should have had his statement suppressed under Rogers.
The Steward opinion, though, added a new twist to its
reading of Bing-it purported to detect, in Bing, an
interpretation of Rogers that entailed the admissibility of
Steward's statements. The Steward opinion stated:
Bing could not be clearer that the Rogers right to counsel bars
questioning on unrelated matters only when a defendant is in
custody on the initial charge upon which the right to counsel has
attached. It does not extend to questioning and result in
suppression when the defendant is subsequently taken into
custody on an unrelated
charge, under circumstances as
10 6
occurred in this case.
Steward, you may recall, was taken into custody not on the
offense for which he was represented, but on another offense,
while Rogers was taken into custody on the offense for which he
was represented. 0 7 Thus, Steward had no derivative right to
counsel under Rogers, and his statements were admissible.
As an initial matter, it is an obvious stretch to claim that
Bing "could not be clearer" on this point; for myself, I did not see
it necessary to start reining it in. After eight years of experience, this Court
determined [in Bing] that the Bartolomeo rule lacked any "principled basis
which justifies its social cost."
Id. at 499-500, 670 N.E.2d at 215-16, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 975-76 (citations omitted).
105 Id. at 500, 670 N.E.2d at 216, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
106 Id. at 502, 670 N.E.2d at 217, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 977 (emphasis added).
107 Steward, 88 N.Y.2d at 497, 670 N.E.2d at 214, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 974; People v.
Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 169-70, 397 N.E.2d 709, 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19-20 (1979).
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this point in Bing before reading Steward, and I still cannot see
it. Sure enough, there are some passages in Bing which, read out
of context, appear to coincide with this thesis: Bing said that
"[o]ur holding [in Rogers], contained in the very first sentences of
the opinion, emphasized that since defendant was represented on
the charge on which he was held in custody, he could not be
interrogated in the absence of counsel on any matter."'0 8 Bing
also said-this being the only support for the thesis cited by both
Steward and the law review Note from which Steward appeared
to have lifted this theory' 09- that:
[A]lthough Rogers and Bartolomeo are frequently linked in legal
literature and Rogers was the only case cited to support the new
rule adopted in Bartolomeo, the two holdings are quite different.
In People v. Rogers, the right to counsel had been invoked on the
charges on which defendant was taken into custody and he and
his counsel clearly asserted it .... In People v. Bartolomeo,
however, defendant was taken into custody for questioning on a
new, unrelated charge. He was not represented on that charge
and freely waived his right to counsel.'1 10
But these quotes miserably fail to establish Steward's claim that
Bing distinguished Rogers from Bartolomeo on the mere ground
that Rogers was taken into custody for the offense for which he
was represented, whereas Bartolomeo was taken into custody for
an offense for which he was not represented (although he was
represented at the time on another, unrelated offense). Bing was
making a much more fundamental point when it described
Rogers' holding and distinguished it from Bartolomeo in the
passage above-namely, that Rogers sought suppression of his
statement by invoking his right to counsel regarding a charge for
which his indelible right to counsel had already attached when he
made his statement, while Bartolomeo sought the suppression of
his statement by invoking a right to counsel in regard to a charge
for which his indelible right to counsel had not yet attached when

108

People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 340, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1016, 559 N.Y.S.2d

474, 479 (1990).
109 The article claimed that "The Bing court distinguished between questioning
with respect to unrelated matters in the context of a single arrest and questioning
about unrelated matters in the context of a separate arrest." Joseph D. Sullivan,
Note, Interaction Between State and Federal Right to Counsel: The Overruling of
Bartolomeo, 8 TOURO L. REV. 191, 226-7 (1991); see also Connolly, supra note 87, at
204 (expressing a similar sentiment).
110 Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 350, 558 N.E.2d at 1022, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
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his statement was made.11 1 The remark that Rogers was taken
into custody for the offense for which he was represented was
entirely incidental to the point being made.
In any event, Steward's reading of Bing could only be a
reading of Bing's dicta, not of Bing's holding. Bing could not
have based the admissibility of its defendants' statements on the
ground claimed by Steward because two of the defendants in
Bing-both Bing and Cawley-were taken into custody for the
offense for which they were represented, and not, like Steward
and Bartolomeo, for an unrelated offense. 11 2 Yet the Steward
Court asserted that Steward's statements were admissible
because "the salient facts of this case fit readily within Bing's
control" and "even produce an a fortiori application... of the
Bing analysis." 113 This claim must be fallacious.
Moreover, Steward's holding makes no sense as a matter of
policy. According to Steward, a defendant in custody could not
waive his right to counsel and answer questions on an unrelated
offense if he were taken into custody for an offense for which he
was represented, but could waive his right if he were taken into
custody for an offense for which he was not represented.1 14 But if
a defendant has his right to counsel attached in one offense, why
should it matter to his right to counsel on another unrelated
offense whether he was taken into custody for the original offense
or for another? (Two of three defendants in Bing, for instance,
were taken into custody for crimes for which they had
outstanding arrest warrants, but were then interrogated
exclusively about unrelated offenses.)
Moreover, since the
defendant is actually represented by an attorney, whether he is
taken into custody for one offense or for another, the rule flies in
the face of the only rationales the Court ever proposed in support
of a derivative right to counsel-viz., that it is the responsibility
of a defendant's attorney, not the State, to determine whether an
interrogation is in fact related or unrelated to the crime for which
a defendant is represented, and that an attorney will not
See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 335-36, 558 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76.
113 People v. Steward, 88 N.Y.2d 496, 501, 670 N.E.2d 214, 216-17, 646
N.Y.S.2d 974, 976-77 (1996).
114 See id.
at 502, 670 N.E.2d at 217, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 977 (stating that the
Rogers right to counsel bars questioning on unrelated matters only when a
defendant is in custody on the initial charge upon which the right to counsel has
attached).
111

112
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"abandon the client" simply because the new charge is
unrelated. 115
The only thing to be said in favor of the Steward opinion is
that it bent over backwards in order to admit a statement whose
suppression was completely unjustified; but with its confused
analysis and its poor rationale it paved the way for subsequent
unjustified suppressions.
V. PEOPLE V. BURDO
People v.
is the latest Court of Appeals authority on
New York's derivative right to counsel. Defendant Burdo was in
jail following his arraignment for rape charges when police
officers, who knew that Burdo was represented by counsel on
those charges, came to question him regarding an unrelated
murder. 117 Burdo agreed to waive his right to counsel and
proceeded to make inculpating statements in regard to that
murder."" Burdo then moved to suppress his statements at the
trial for the murder charge, claiming that his statements were
obtained in violation of his right to counsel under the New York
Constitution. 119 Burdo clearly claimed a derivative indelible
right to counsel-a right to counsel derived solely from the
unrelated rape offenses for which he was represented, and with
20
which he was already charged, at the time of the questioning.
The trial court agreed with Burdo and suppressed the
Burdo"16

116 As then-Judge Kaye noted in her dissenting opinion,
Those conclusions rested on two key observations about the attorneyclient relationship. First, as the court noted, even as to charges unrelated
to the subject of an existing representation, the attorney naturally would
not abandon the client. And second, it "is the role of defendant's attorney,
not the State, to determine whether a particular matter will or will not
touch upon the extant charge." Rogers established that the "relatedness" of
pending charges, henceforth, would be determined not by law enforcement
authorities, or even by courts, but by the attorneys who were actually
representing the defendants.
Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 354, 558 N.E.2d at 1024-25, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 487-88 (Kaye, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (quoting People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 173, 397
N.E.2d 709, 713, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18, 22 (1979)).
116 91 N.Y.2d 146, 690 N.E.2d 854, 667 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1997).
117 Id. at 148, 690 N.E.2d at 854, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 970. On the right to counsel
in regard to interrogations on related offenses, see supra note 20.
118 Burdo, 91 N.Y.2d at 148, 690 N.E.2d at 854-55, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 970-71.
119 People v. Burdo, 224 A.D.2d 115, 116, 649 N.Y.S.2d 949, 950 (3d Dep't 1996),
aff'd, People v. Burdo, 91 N.Y.2d 146, 690 N.E.2d 854, 667 N.Y.S.2d 970 (1997).
120 Burdo, 224 A.D.2d at 116-18, 649 N.Y.S.2d at 950.
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statements, the Appellate Division affirmed the suppression, and
the Court of Appeals granted review of the case and affirmed.
The opinion, a very short one, claimed that People v. Rogers fully
governed the matter:
[W]e underscore that our decision neither expands nor narrows
Rogers, which established the principle that a defendant
represented by counsel on the charge on which he is held in
custody cannot be interrogated in the absence of counsel "on any
matter."
For nearly two decades Rogers has stood as a
We reject the
workable, comprehensible, bright line rule ....
121
....
Rogers
modify
now
to
dissent
the
by
forth
put
proposal
For the sake of good form, let us reiterate why Burdo was
not, and could not have been, governed by Rogers: Rogers
suppressed statements at a trial for an offense for which the
defendant was represented by counsel at the time that his
statements were made; Burdo, by contrast, suppressed
statements at a trial for an offense for which the defendant had
no counsel, requested no counsel, and had no formal proceedings
Thus, Rogers' holding, and its
commenced against him. 122
rationale, were inapplicable to Burdo. Moreover, whatever
dubious arguments one could make in favor of reading a
derivative right into Rogers, such a derivative right was
conclusively eliminated by Bing.
Indeed, Bing held admissible the statements of defendants
who, like Burdo, were in custody for offenses for which they were
represented, were questioned about unrelated offenses for which
their indelible right to counsel had not yet attached, and who
then sought suppression of their statements at the trial for these
unrelated offenses. What, then, distinguished Burdo from the
defendants in Bing, whose statements were admissible despite
Bing's affirmation of the continuing validity of Rogers? The
Burdo Court never explicitly addressed this crucial and rather
obvious question (as previously stated, Burdo was a brief opinion
that hardly addressed any question); but when declaring that
Rogers mandated the suppression of Burdo's statements, the
Court stated:
Rogers clearly applies to the instant case. Defendant was in
custody at the Clinton County jail pursuant to a pending charge
of rape and assault. It is also conceded that defendant had been
121
122

Burdo, 91 N.Y.2d at 150-51, 690 N.E.2d at 856, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
Id. at 148, 690 N.E.2d at 854, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 970.
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assigned legal representation following his arraignment and
subsequent incarceration on a pending charge. The officers who
questioned defendant were fully aware of these facts and
proceeded to interrogate the defendant anyway. Under a plain
prohibited from questioning
reading of Rogers, the State was
123
him under these circumstances.
Thus the difference between Bing and Burdo-and therefore
the reason why Rogers presumably mandated the suppression of
Burdo's statements but not the suppression of the statements in
Bing-was that in Burdo the police officers "were fully aware" of
defendant's representation, whereas the officers in the Bing
cases, "though alerted by the outstanding bench warrant[s],
made no inquiry about the representation. ."..",124 This theory
therefore holds that Bing overruled Bartolomeo, not in order to
eliminate the derivative right to counsel, but in order to
eliminate the attribution of knowledge of representation to the
police (that knowledge being a precondition for the attachment of
the derivative right to counsel). We already saw the absurdity of
125
this interpretation of Bing when we analyzed People v. West.
To make a long story short, in contradiction with Burdo's
proclamation that its decision "neither expands nor narrows
Rogers," Burdo was a repeat of the unjustifiable, and
unexplained, expansion of Rogers' holding. Moreover, Burdo's
error was particularly extraordinary because the lone dissenter
in the case alerted the majority to the opinion's contradiction
with Bing, stating in no uncertain terms that "[i]f Rogers were
read to mean what the majority now ascribes to it, then the
Court in Bing would have been required to overrule Rogers
also .... ,"126 And yet no analysis seeking to refute this grave
allegation was undertaken.
The majority's obstinate adherence to its mistake may have
been induced by the fact that the dissent itself, although
presenting a legal analysis far superior to the majority's,
advanced a faulty interpretation of the Rogers/BartolomeolBing
123
124

Id. at 150, 690 N.E.2d at 856, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 972 (footnote omitted).
People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 335, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1013, 559 N.Y.S.2d

474, 476 (1990). In the third case, People v. Medina, 146 A.D.2d 344, 541 N.Y.S.2d
355 (1st Dep't 1989), the officer mistakenly believed that the previous charge was
dismissed. Id. at 345-46, 541 N.Y.S.2d at 355-56.
125 See supra Part III.
126 Burdo, 91 N.Y.2d at 155, 690 N.E.2d at 859, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 975 (Wesley, J.,
dissenting).
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trilogy. I will not engage in a full exposition of the dissent's
proposal (the proposal was confusing and complicated, and things
are complicated and confusing enough as they are), but let me
offer the following relatively brief synopsis.
According to the dissent, Rogers did not apply to the three
cases in Bing because Rogers' right to counsel arose out of his
right against self-incrimination, and Rogers also had an actual
and substantial attorney-client relationship. 12 7 In Bing, by
contrast (so claimed the dissent), the right to counsel arose
merely out of the initiation of formal proceedings, and the
defendants' 128relationships
with
their
attorneys
were
"superficial."
The dissent's suggested holding was that
"defendant must establish an actual [rather than a superficial]
attorney-client relationship or an invocation of his right to
counsel under the Fifth Amendment of the United States
Constitution and article I, § 6 of our State Constitution [in the
original, unrelated offense] before the protection of Rogers
becomes available."' 29 Thus, defendants could not waive their
right to counsel in the absence of counsel regarding an unrelated
offense if: (1) the right to counsel for the original offense arose in
the context of the right against self incrimination (as when a
defendant requests to speak to an attorney before answering
questions, or an attorney instructs the police to stop the
questioning); or (2) the right to counsel for the original offense
arose out of an actual and substantial counsel-client relationship.
But defendants could waive their right to counsel if it arose out
of the mere initiation of formal proceedings and they did not have
an actual and substantial counsel-client relationship in the
original, unrelated offense - which is why, according to the
dissent, Burdo's statements should have been admissible. 30 In
short, the dissent proposed a distinction between those
defendants who enjoy a derivative right to counsel and those who
do not based on the source of the right to counsel and the type of
counsel-client relationship in the original unrelated offense, and
this distinction was supposedly found in Bing and its reading of

127 Id. at 154, 690 N.E.2d at 858, 667
128 Id. at 155, 690 N.E.2d at 859, 667
129 Id. at 151, 690 N.E.2d at 856, 667
130 Note the similarity with West in
supra note 77 and accompanying text.

N.Y.S.2d at 974 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
N.Y.S.2d at 975 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
N.Y.S.2d at 972 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
regard to the "actual representation." See
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31
Rogers and Bartolomeo.1
Indeed, according to the dissent,
Bartolomeo was overruled by Bing because it "extended the
Rogers rule to hold that the mere pendency of one matter in
which the [indelible] right to counsel had attached prohibited the
police from questioning a suspect about other matters, related or
unrelated" (whereas what was actually needed for a Rogers
derivative right, according to the dissent, was either an
invocation of the right to counsel in the context of the right
against self incrimination, or an actual and substantial client132
counsel relationship-not the mere pendency of a charge).
This awkward proposal stemmed from the dissent's wish to
align New York's right to counsel with its federal counterpart,
while at the same time paying lip service to the unique historical
development, and to the binding precedents, of the New York
right.133
But the proposal offered a blatantly wrong
interpretation of Rogers, Bartolomeo, and Bing, and also seemed
to fly in the face of the factual scenarios of these cases. As an
initial matter, as we saw, Bing overruled Bartolomeo for
inventing a derivative right to counsel, not merely for deriving
that right from the "mere pendency" of an unrelated charge.
Indeed, Bing criticized Bartolomeo for failing to explain "why
Rogers should be expanded so dramatically to protect a suspect
against self-incrimination on the new crime unrelated to the
matter
upon
which
defendant
actually
obtained
representation"-a criticism showing little concern with whether
a defendant's original right to counsel arose out of the right
against self incrimination, or from an "actual" client-lawyer

131 Burdo, 91 N.Y.2d at 151-60, 690 N.E.2d at 856-62, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 972-78
(Wesley, J., dissenting).
132 Id. at 153, 690 N.E.2d at 858, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 974 (Wesley, J., dissenting).
133 The dissent's holding sought to emulate U.S. Supreme Court decisions
differentiating the right to counsel arising from the right against self-incrimination
(Fifth Amendment right to counsel) from the right to counsel arising from the
commencement of formal proceedings (Sixth Amendment right to counsel). See id. at
159, 690 N.E.2d at 861-62, 667 N.Y.S.2d at 977-78 (Wesley, J., dissenting). The
problem with the claim was that New York's own constitutional right to counselupon which Burdo's claim was based-did not recognize this distinction. The dissent
thus opted to draw the line along the mentioned, and partly overlapping, distinction
which New York law did recognize. See id. at 151-52, 690 N.E.2d at 856-57, 667
N.Y.S.2d at 972-73 (Wesley, J., dissenting); see also People v. West, 81 N.Y.2d 370,
373-74, 615 N.E.2d 968, 970-71, 599 N.Y.S.2d 484, 486-87 (1993). Hence the
dissent's insistence that Rogers' right to counsel attaches either when the defendant
requests an attorney while in custody, or when he is actually represented by an
attorney.
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relationship.13 4 In fact, it was practically impossible to tell from
Bing's description of the facts before it whether any of its
individual defendants had counsel because he had requested one
in the context of the right against self-incrimination, or because
he had actually retained one, or simply because of the
commencement of formal proceedings. 135
Moreover, Bing
explicitly rejected the prosecution's suggestion in People v.
Cawley to carve an exception to Bartolomeo, and hence to admit
Cawley's statements, on the basis of Cawley's superficial
1 36
relationship with his attorney (it being a result of his escape).
Furthermore, Bartolomeo was a case where the defendant
was actually represented by counsel-not merely a case where a
defendant's right to counsel has attached due to the pendency of
a charge (we were told that Bartolomeo was represented by
counsel at his arraignment and that he "did have an attorney
acting on his behalf"1 37); and yet the Burdo dissent maintained,
without offering an explanation, that Bartolomeo was not
entitled to Rogers' derivative right. In fact, Burdo himself was
also "actually represented"-at least in the natural sense of these
words (and, as matter of fact, it was also impossible to determine
from the facts spelled out in Burdo the source of Burdo's right to
134 People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 341, 558 N.E.2d 1011, 1017, 559 N.Y.S.2d
474, 480 (1990).
135 Bing merely said:
In People v. Bing, defendant, suspected of a New York burglary, was
arrested in Nassau County on an Ohio warrant after a police teletype
confirmed that he was wanted for burglary in that State. He had counsel on
the pending Ohio charge ....

In People v. Cawley, defendant was charged in New York with robbery,
second degree. Following his arraignment, with counsel present, he was
admitted to bail....
In People v. Medina, defendant was convicted of murdering two neighbors.
A detective investigating the homicides learned that defendant had
recently been released from jail after being held on an assault charge....
Defendant moved to suppress the statements ...
because of his
representation on the prior charge.
Id. at 335-36, 558 N.E.2d at 1012-13, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 475-76.
136 "Mhe exception urged in Cawley would require the trial court to inquire into
the substantiality of the attorney-client relationship, a matter which has not
concerned us in Bartolomeo cases previously, to determine if the suspect could waive
a right which we have held indelible once it attaches." Id. at 337, 558 N.E.2d at
1014, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
137 People v. Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d 225, 231-32, 423 N.E.2d 371, 374-75, 440
N.Y.S.2d 894, 897 (1981).
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counsel). The dissenter never allowed these uncomfortable facts
to get in the way of his theory: he simply ignored Bartolomeo's
But he never explained what
actual representation. 13 8
distinguished a superficial counsel-client relationship from an
actual one, or why that distinction should make a difference to a
defendant's right to counsel in an unrelated offense.
Seeking to reconcile New York's right to counsel with its
federal equivalent, the dissent distorted the facts of the relevant
precedents, offered an untenable interpretation of their holdings,
and suggested a rule which was confusing and also unjustified as
a matter of policy. The Burdo majority, forced to choose between
its own mistaken interpretation and the dissent's, stuck with its
own.
VI. THE CORRECT INTERPRETATION

The correct interpretation of Rogers, Bartolomeo, and Bing
should be clear by now, but I will briefly summarize it for
clarity's sake.
As we saw, People v. Rogers suppressed a
statement at the trial for an offense for which the defendant's
indelible right to counsel had already attached at the time that
he made his statement. The Rogers Court simply viewed Rogers'
continued questioning on "unrelated activities in which he had
not participated," after his attorney's request that the
questioning stop, as a ruse aimed at subverting an existing
indelible right to counsel. 139 Nowhere did Rogers hold-and
indeed it had no occasion to hold-that its ruling applied to the
admissibility of statements at a trial on such "unrelated
activities." 140 Whatever ambiguous statements one finds in
Rogers in support of such an interpretation are mere dicta, and
ambiguous and even self-contradictory dicta at that.
138 Id.
at 236-40, 423 N.E.2d 377-79, 440 N.Y.S.2d 900-02 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting).
139 People v. Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, 170, 397 N.E.2d 709, 711, 422 N.Y.S.2d 18,
20 (1979).
140 See Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 340, 558 N.E.2d at 1016, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 479 ("We
concluded [in Rogers] that the statement was anything but spontaneous and had
resulted from exploiting custody on the crime on which Rogers had counsel....
Under such circumstances, the Taylor rule necessarily gave way to insure that
questioning stopped and 'accidental' interference with the established lawyer-client
relationship was avoided."); People v. Robles, 72 N.Y.2d 689, 697-98, 533 N.E.2d
240, 244, 536 N.Y.S.2d 401, 405 (1988) ("[O]ur primary concern in Rogers was that
questioning on unrelated charges might interfere with the attorney-client
relationship that existed with respect to the pending charges.").
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People v. Bartolomeo, however, purported to apply Rogers to
the case of a defendant who was represented by counsel on
another unrelated offense at the time that he made his
statements, and then sought the suppression of his statements at
the trial, not on the original offense for which he was
represented, but on the new, unrelated charges.1 4 '
The
Bartolomeo decision thus gave rise to New York's derivative right
to counsel in a short and barely elaborated paragraph, by relying
on Rogers for a proposition that Rogers never made.
Bing overruled this unjustified, and possibly unjustifiable,
expansion of Rogers. Perceiving that Bartolomeo's right to
counsel arose mysteriously out of his right to counsel for another
unrelated offense, Bing moved to eliminate this "fictional"
indelible right "derived from a prior charge,"'142 describing
Bartolomeo (in the words of the dissent) as an "aberrant decision
not worthy of precedential respect, a decision without a
principled basis or even a rationale.' ' 4 3 Thus, Bing eliminated
any indelible right to counsel arising from a defendant's
representation on an unrelated crime. Bing, however, preserved
Rogers, thereby retaining the rule that any statements made
after a purported waiver of the indelible right to counsel without
counsel present, whether made in response to questioning on
related or on unrelated crimes, would be suppressed at the trial
for an offense for which the defendant's indelible right to counsel
had already attached at the time of questioning.
Unlike Bartolomeo or Burdo, Bing was a lengthy, detailed,
and well-argued opinion.
Unfortunately, it retained Rogers
without an explicit explanation as to what it meant by that,
thereby leaving the door open for the confusions and distortions
44
that followed.
141 Bartolomeo, 53 N.Y.2d at 236, 423 N.E.2d at 377, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 900
(Wachtler, J., dissenting).
142 Bing, 76 N.Y.2d at 349, 558 N.E.2d at 1021, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 484.
143 Id. at 352, 558 N.E.2d at 1023, 559 N.Y.S.2d at 486 (Kaye, J., concurring and
dissenting).
144 Rogers and Bing do not exhaust defendants' right to counsel in the context of
a custodial interrogation on offenses unrelated to those for which a defendant's right
to counsel has attached.
A 1988 U.S. Supreme Court case, Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988),
upheld the suppression of statements made by a defendant who requested to see an
attorney during an interrogation (pursuant to the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel), remained in custody for three days without yet seeing an attorney, and was
then questioned (after waiver of Miranda rights) about an unrelated offense in
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CONCLUSION

We saw that People v. Rogers' holding had nothing to do with
a derivative right to counsel; that Rogers was misinterpreted by
People v. Bartolomeo; that People v. Bing, which overruled
Bartolomeo, sought to eliminate the misinterpretation of Rogers,
and with it the derivative right to counsel; that People v. West, in
dicta, presented Bing's dissenting opinion as if it were Bing's
holding, claiming that Rogers was about a derivative right; that
People v. Steward, while subscribing to West's mistaken
interpretation of Rogers and Bing, sought to limit Rogers'
applicability by purporting to discover a new distinction in Bing's
dicta; and that People v. Burdo, adopting the misinterpretations
of Rogers and Bing appearing in both West and Steward, used
those misinterpretations to formally reintroduce that same
whose commission he then incriminated himself. The Supreme Court reasoned that
since the accused was continuously in police custody from the time of asserting his
Fifth Amendment right through the time of the questioning, so that "[t]he coercive
environment never dissipated," "the resumption of questioning by the police without
the requested attorney being provided strongly suggest[ed] to the accused that he
ha[d] no choice but to answer." Id. at 679 & n.2. The Court concluded that "the
presumption raised by a suspect's request for counsel-that he considers himself
unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal
assistance-does not disappear simply because the police have approached the
suspect, still in custody, still without counsel, about a separate investigation." Id. at
683. Thus, "reinterrogation may only occur if 'the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.'" Id. at 680-81. The
Court added that "the continuing investigation of uncharged offenses did not violate
the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel"-thereby
drawing a clear distinction between a defendant's request for attorney during
interrogation and a defendant's right to counsel in other contexts (the same
distinction the Burdo dissent sought to adopt). Id. at 685.
In Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990), the Supreme Court applied
Roberson by ordering the suppression of a statement made by a defendant who was
held in custody, asked to see an attorney, met with his attorney, and was then again
interrogated by the police on the police's initiative. Id. at 148-49, 156. The defendant
was interrogated on the same offense, but at least the dissent in Minnick thought
that the same result would have been required had the defendant been interrogated
on an unrelated offense. See id. at 163 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Of course, neither Taylor, nor Rogers, nor Bartolomeo, nor Bing, nor West, nor
Steward, nor Burdo presented the New York Court of Appeals with similar
questions (that is, cases where a defendant requested to see an attorney before
making his statement), and the decisions' rationales do not apply to any of those
cases. Granted, the suppression of Roberson's or Minnick's statements are probably
mandated under New York's own right to counsel jurisprudence as well (in which
case, however, reinterrogation would not be possible upon the defendants' initiation
of further communication, since New York's indelible right to counsel is stricter than
its federal equivalent), but neither of the cases above governs the issue.
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derivative right to counsel that Rogers never had and Bing, in
any case, eliminated.
This is an embarrassing saga: the Court, divided and
confused, is incapable of settling on a straight course; instead, it
veers from side to side, without acknowledging or even
recognizing its vagaries. If we take Burdo seriously (and this
Article believes we should not), crediting its holding over any
inconsistencies with prior precedents (of which there are many),
the state of the law today is this: a defendant who is actually
represented by counsel on one offense (mere attachment of right
to counsel without assignment or retention of counsel would not
suffice), and who is then interrogated in custody on another,
unrelated offense, may waive his right to counsel in the absence
of counsel in regard to that unrelated offense only if: (1) the
interrogating police officers are not fully aware of the fact that
the defendant is represented on an unrelated charge (even if the
officers know there is a pending charge against the defendant, or
that the defendant was arrested for such a pending charge, and
even if they belong to the police unit which initiated the prior
arrest and charge); 145 or (2) the defendant was not taken into
custody for the offense for which he is actually represented 146even if the defendant was taken into custody for the offense for
which he was represented and was then released and
immediately re-arrested only so that he could waive his right to
counsel (there is Appellate Division authority for this
147
proposition).
As we saw, this tortuous rule was announced in a series of
badly reasoned opinions that offered little by way of legal
analysis or policy justifications, and which were often opposed by
equally misguided dissents. Interestingly, as mentioned in the
footnotes, these decisions relied on several law review Notes and

145 This is the upshot of Steward's and West's interpretation of Bing's overruling
of Bartolomeo.
146 Even if he is taken into custody for an offense other than the one for which
suppression of statements is subsequently sought, that is, even if he is taken into
custody for a third offense (these were the circumstances in Steward). And if he is
taken into custody for the offense for which he is represented, the defendant could
not waive his right to counsel in the absence of counsel even if interrogated
exclusively about an unrelated offense.
147 See People v. Walker, 285 A.D.2d 660, 662-64, 727 N.Y.S.2d 731, 734-35 (3d
Dep't 2001).
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articles which were of equally poor quality. 148 The harmful
consequences are plenty. First, the rule makes no sense as a
matter of policy. For one thing, what could be more reasonable
than attributing knowledge of representation to a police officer
who knows a defendant was recently arrested for a different
crime, or was in jail on a pending charge, in those cases where
the defendant is indeed represented (and where representation,
one might add, is a rather reasonable inference)? Any rule to the
contrary simply invites the police to remain ignorant. But why
should a defendant's constitutional right to counsel depend on
the knowledge or ignorance of the interrogating officer? That
knowledge or ignorance has nothing to do with the right against
self-incrimination, or due process, or fairness, or the wish to
avoid reliance on unreliable confessions, or any other
constitutional policy in which the right to counsel is grounded.
Indeed, if the police's knowledge or ignorance of representation
determine the defendant's right to counsel when he is questioned
on unrelated offenses, why should it not determine the
defendant's right to counsel in the original offense as well?
The distinction between represented defendants taken into
custody for the offense for which they are represented, and
represented defendants taken into custody for other offenses, is
equally silly. Why should it matter to a defendant's right to
counsel whether the arresting officer arrested her for an earlier
pending charge or for the charge for which she was about to be
questioned? And why should it matter to a defendant's right to
counsel whether she is awaiting the resolution of unrelated
charges in jail or on bail? A defendant may spend many months
in jail on a pending charge, especially when the charges are
severe and the defendant is a flight-risk. And often, especially
when the prosecution's case is strong, defendants choose to spend
the time between arraignment and trial (or plea) in jail instead of
out on bail: any time spent in the jail will be deducted as time
served at the time of sentencing, and defendants may be anxious
to start serving their time. Moreover, county jails are generally
less harsh places than the tougher state prisons in which a
defendant might ultimately end up. Thus, a defendant who is
represented on a pending matter is more likely to be in custody if
he is a severe offender with a strong case against him. In

148

See supra notes 39, 87 & 109.
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overruling Bartolomeo, the Bing Court noted that the Bartolomeo
rule "favors recidivists over first-time arrestees" in that first time
arrestees could waive their right to counsel and answer police
questions, whereas recidivists who were represented on another,
unrelated crime, could not. The current rule compounds this
absurdity in that it not only favors recidivists over first-time
arrestees, but also favors serious offenders over minor ones
(insofar as minor offenders are likely to be released while their
charges are pending).
Additionally, under this rule, the derivative right attaches
only when a defendant is actually represented by counsel (on the
original, unrelated offense), but not if his indelible right to
counsel has attached merely due to the commencement of formal
proceeding.
But why should it matter to a defendant's
constitutional right, once formal proceeding has begun, whether
he is already represented by counsel, or whether he hasn't yet
retained or been assigned one? Indeed, defendants who are lucky
enough to have a counsel assigned at arraignment, or are
sufficiently experienced or well-off to immediately retain one, are
accorded more constitutional protections than those who are less
well-off or experienced, or are just unlucky (no available attorney
happened to be at hand at the time of arraignment). This is one
more instance where constitutional protections under the current
149
regime depend on the most irrelevant of factors.
What is more, this legal regime corrupts our law
enforcement officers by inviting them to "play with the rules." If
a police officer keeps himself ignorant of a defendant's
representation, the defendant's indelible right to counsel does not
attach. If a defendant is disingenuously "released" and then
immediately re-arrested on another charge, he may waive his
right to counsel in the absence of counsel. 50 Police officers
149

See, e.g., People v. Smith, 5 A.D.3d 991, 991, 773 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (4th

Dep't 2004) (observing no indication in the record that interrogating officer did not
know defendant was represented); People v. Harvey, 273 A.D.2d 604, 605, 710
N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (3d Dep't 2000) (holding that a Rogers' derivative right to counsel
does not arise if the right to counsel on the original offense derives merely from the
commencement of formal proceeding and counsel was not yet assigned, though
assignment would have sufficed to invoke the right); People v. Tenace, 256 A.D.2d
928, 930, 682 N.Y.S.2d 279, 281 (3d Dep't 1998) (finding that although defendant
was represented by counsel on a pending charge, he was in custody on a third,
unrelated charge).
150 As already noted, a recent Appellate Division case held that such a ruse,
contrived to allow questioning on the unrelated matter, would do the trick. See
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cannot be expected to make fine legal distinctions between those
constitutional rights which are properly avoided through
chicanery and those which are not. Rules such as this send their
corrupting influence throughout the criminal justice system by
presenting constitutional protections as empty shells-as absurd
formalities to be treated with a mere ceremonial nod of the head.
Further, the rule is responsible for ever growing confusions
and misunderstandings among lower courts.
A review of
appellate court decisions shows rulings with no serious analysis
of the governing law (indeed that would entail quite an
undertaking), where conclusions are often drawn without the
rule's most relevant facts stated on record. 15 1 And it shows
courts, baffled by a rule whose policy goals have become
indiscernible, reaching resolutions through unprincipled hairsplitting. 152
One can only imagine what trial court
153
determinations look like, or what the police make of all this.
Indeed, it is quite difficult to assess the full impact of these
faulty Court of Appeals decisions-including the number of
dropped or unsuccessful prosecutions, or the favorable bargains
struck by defendants whose admissions were believed by the
prosecution to be tainted or inadmissible. Whatever that number

Walker, 285 A.D.2d at 662-64, 727 N.Y.S.2d at 734-35.
151 See, e.g., People v. Lyons, 22 A.D.3d 606, 606, 801 N.Y.S.2d 752, 752 (2d
Dep't 2005); People v. Eberle, 265 A.D.2d 881, 882, 697 N.Y.S.2d 218, 219-20 (4th
Dep't 1999) (ordering suppression of statements made by the defendant without
mentioning the knowledge of representation of the investigating officer); see also
People v. Whaley, 255 A.D.2d 980, 980, 681 N.Y.S.2d 716, 716 (4th Dep't 1998);
People v. Casey, 181 Misc. 2d 744, 746, 698 N.Y.S.2d 404, 406 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d

Dep't 1999).
152 See, e.g., People v. Scaccia, 6 A.D.3d 1105, 1105-06, 776 N.Y.S.2d 420, 421
(4th Dep't 2004) (concluding that Rogers applies only to defendants in custody);
People v. Clarke, 298 A.D.2d 259, 259, 748 N.Y.S.2d 376, 377 (1st Dep't 2002)
('There was no violation of defendant's derivative right to counsel under People v.
Rogers, 48 N.Y.2d 167, because a rearrest on a bench warrant [for which defendant
was represented], followed by immediate questioning at the police station prior to
any court proceedings or reincarceration on the warrant, is not the type of custody
contemplated by the Rogers rationale."); People v. McNear, 265 A.D.2d 810, 810, 696
N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (4th Dep't 1999) (finding that although he was arraigned on the
prior charge, "defendant failed to meet his burden of establishing that an attorney
had been assigned on that charge"); People v. Fiber, 261 A.D.2d 484, 484, 692
N.Y.S.2d 396, 396-97 (2d Dep't 1999) (citing Bing to support its holding that since
defendant was in custody in New Jersey, and under New Jersey law no indelible
right to counsel had attached, defendant's right to counsel was not violated).
153 1 once had the distinct pleasure of trying to explain all this to a police
detective.
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is, it is too high. The rule requires the suppression of perfectly
voluntary statements in the name of a dubious policy and in
contradiction of any serious analysis of the governing
precedents. 5 4
The bottom line is this:
Burdo should be
scrapped, the dicta in West should be ignored, and the decision in
Steward should be reinterpreted so as to accord with the correct
reading of Rogers and Bing. Moreover, it is not necessary for
lower courts to await the formal overruling of Steward and
Burdo.
These cases were exercises in self-contradiction,
purporting to rely on Bing's reading of Rogers while contradicting
that very reading. Steward and Burdo were both mistakes that
should be ignored. (That lower courts are not constrained by
Steward and Burdo is a proposition whose full defense, and
theoretical ramifications, are too lengthy for this place; suffices to
say that it is a proposition explicitly supported by legal
authorities in New York). 155 Legal analysis is not error-free;
mistakes occur, especially when more and more precedents
accumulate and the attempt to reconcile and explain them
becomes intellectually challenging. But legal analysis should
never become a hostage to such errors. When they are identified,
these errors should be swiftly delegated to the dustbin of history.
The Court of Appeals may, of course, embark on a new path yet
again, breaking with Bing and adopting a rule along the lines
suggested in Steward or Burdo, but it may not do so by
unwittingly misreading and distorting the precedents upon

154

The derivative right to counsel could also mandate the suppression of

physical evidence. See People v. Loomis, 255 A.D.2d 916, 916, 682 N.Y.S.2d 743,
743-44 (4th Dep't 1998).
155

In general, this Court is duty bound to follow the decisions of higher
courts. But, stare decisis is a principle of guidance, not "a contrivance to
hamper the judge in administering justice." Its force is not mechanical or
automatic; to the contrary, it is a "moral obligation only"-where the law
has been misunderstood or misapplied, or contrary to reason, "staredecisis"
does not inhibit correction ....
[T]his Court not only can but should render
decision as it finds the law to be.
Park-58 Corp. v. Reder, 21 Misc. 2d 395, 397, 196 N.Y.S.2d 39, 42 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct.
N.Y. County 1960)(citation omitted). This principle is all the more applicable here
given the lack of any serious analysis in Burdo, and the obscure and faulty analysis
of Steward. Indeed, "a precedent is less binding if it is little more than an ipse dixit,
a conclusory assertion of result, perhaps supported by no more than generalized
platitudes." People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 490, 348 N.E.2d 894, 902, 384
N.Y.S.2d 419, 426 (1976). Moreover, a lower court's deviance from precedent is not,
by itself, a sufficient ground for reversal.
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which it purports to rely. It may only do so consciously, with
open eyes, and with a proper analysis. This, indeed, is what the
rule of law is about. But then again, what conscious open-eyed
court would have adopted the Burdo ruling?

